This is a preliminary proceeding in an appeal of an order issued by the Automobile Club Inter-Insurance Exchange, seeking a certification as to whether the automobile club’s policy of commercial insurance issued to petitioner Mark…complains of a policy of liability insurance. The court is urged to enter its opinion as to whether it should disturb the Automobile Club’s position and require that Mark pay the increased premium because he was not licensed to operate a personal automobile. We are aware of the Automobile Club’s reliance upon an article of Congress stating that the issue of liability insurance was decided by Congress. However, we doubt that Congress intended to limit the liability of automobile clubs to those held liable under sections 5aa and 6aa of the Code. Accordingly, the question becomes whether there are any other alternatives to the automatic stay in this case.

automobile club interinsurance

We believe the answer is “yes.” There is no reason to vacate the certificate of authority when there is a question of financial responsibility at issue. There certainly is no reason to deny access to liability insurance to otherwise qualified drivers who are unable or unwilling to comply with the terms of that coverage. That being said, we also realize that it is often difficult to obtain the summary judgment motion that is required in this case.

There are many reasons why we advise that you seek the services of a Certified Indicator in this situation. First, it is important to remember that the Certified Indicator is not a master. Unlike a master planner, it is not concerned with the precise numbers that will win every time. Rather, a Certified Indicator merely provides information about what has happened. It is up to the trier of fact, the trial court, to make the determination as to the nature of the facts underlying that information.

Second, the Certified Indicator is an outside party. The fact that it is not employed by either the automobile club itself nor the insurance company whose insured activity it monitors speaks volumes about the independence of this third-party observer. This fact alone can lead to a different interpretation of events related to such monitoring. For instance, if the trial court orders the automobile club to produce documents showing that it routinely engages in this activity, the fact that the Certified Indicator is not employed by the club but rather by the insurance company could lead the court to conclude that the club itself is guilty of engaging in activities “unaided by law.”

Third, the Certified Indicator cannot make any determination other than those made by the trial court. Given that it is the insurance company that is the subject of the investigation, it is obviously impossible for any independent observer to investigate the medical protective activities of the auto club. In light of our previously stated observations, we believe that it is likely that the Certified Indicator has a conflict of interest that may cause it to come into contact with the medical protective activities of one of its clients. Because the Indicator is not employed by either the automobile club itself or the insurer whose insured activity it monitors, there is a strong likelihood that the Indicator makes a disproportionate risk assessment of one of its clients when it comes to engaging in medical protective measures.

Fourth, even if we assume that there is a significant risk of suffering from a potential injury from one of the automobile club’s insured events, there is still no basis for holding the club responsible for making its decisions about whether or not it should seek a Declaratory Judgment. The Indicator, like the medical protective officers of most other health care insurance providers, is simply a neutral party. Declaratory judgments are not reviewable by an ordinary consumer. Therefore, even if we assume that the Indicator has a material relationship with one of the automobile clubs’ insured events, that relationship will not bar the Indicator from refusing to obtain a Declaratory Judgment. In light of our construction of the word “risk”, we believe that the existence of a material relationship between the Indicator and one of the automobile clubs’ insured events does not establish a case or cause of negligence.

Fifth, even if we assume that the Indicator has a relationship with one of the automobile clubs’ insured events, there is still no case or cause of liability arising from such a relationship. The automobile clubs’ insured event is not a risk to the Indicator. The Indicator cannot lose a potential client because of the risk of the automobile club’s insured event. As previously explained, the Indicator is not employed by either the automobile club itself or any of its insured participants, and there is no reason why it would be compelled to engage in activities of which it does not perceive as having any significant risk associated with them.

Sixth, we hold that an Internet-based service, such as the one that the Indicator engages in today, presents a different problem. Because an Internet service freely offers personal information to all Internet users, it presents a unique problem for monitoring compliance with the SOX on the Internet. There are too many questions as to the nature of the personal information that must be shared and the security that must be maintained. It is easy to foresee a massive liability issue if the information within the personal information on the Internet is freely accessible by anyone who chooses to look up the SOX.

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